Florian Bieber

Religious Minorities between the secular state and rising Islam

Alevis, Armenians and Jews in Turkey


1.    Alevis

2.    The non-Muslim Minorities

2.1. Armenians

2.2. Jews

3.    The Islamisation of Turkey and the prospects for Religious Minorities

4.    Endnotes

5.    Literature


The modern republic of Turkey was founded on the ruins of one of the great multinational powers, the Ottoman Empire. The lands under the rule of the Ottoman dynasty not only reached from Arabia to Hungary, but also included a multitude of ethnic and religious minorities on its territory. While Turkey inherited a large share of this diversity, it has decreased considerably since the war of liberation, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. Of the millets, the self-administrative communities of Jews, Armenians and Orthodox within the Empire, only small groups remain. Most of them live in Istanbul. Besides these Jewish and Christian minorities, Turkey is also the home to a much larger Muslim minority – the Alevis. 

While it is worthwhile examining the status and the development of minorities in their own right, it is important to view them as an indicator of nation-building in Turkey. The treatment of such minorities allows the observer to draw conclusions on the concept of nationhood and the general attitude towards the ”other,” encompassing minorities in general.

This paper will focus only on religious minorities, while bearing in mind the multitude of ethnic divisions within Turkey, the Kurds just being the largest and most prominent group. This paper will also not analyse the legal framework of the minority’s position, but rather their real living conditions in Turkey today. Furthermore there is no space to make a mention of all religious minorities. Here the topic shall be limited just to the three most prominent and largest religious minorities: the Alevis, the Armenian community and the Jews [1].  Their development and treatment is representative and applies mostly to the other religious minorities as well.

The latter two communities can serve as an example of the relationship between Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and the treatment of its minorities. The analysis of the Alevis shall demonstrate the situation of a large, but marginalised, minority in Turkey. All of them are paradoxically threatened by the secular state and the rise of Political Islam at the same time.[2] 

 

This seeming contradiction will be examined throughout the paper.

At first it might seem surprising that the situation of religious minorities is more precarious in a secular republic than in the previous Islamic Ottoman state. This development is nevertheless obvious when bearing in mind two factors. First of all the aggressively secular nature of the state did not only effect the dominant Sunni establishment, but also all other religious groups.

The Ottoman state generally recognised the other main religions based on the scripture, that is Christianity and Judaism, despite not treating them as equals. The Turkish state deprived these groups of their prime identifying characteristic - religion. Since religious minorities are in a weaker position than the majority, the closure of schools and churches/synagogues had greater effects on their identity than the same actions taken against Sunni Islam. Consequently religious minorities had to suffer harsher consequences from the secularisation than Sunni Islam.

Secondly, one has to consider the conception of Turkish nationhood. While leading politicians continuously proclaim that the Turkish nation extends to all its citizens, the reality and underlying ideology of Turkish nationalism takes different perspective. The Turkish nation defines itself as a nation of Turks, speaking Turkish as language and having common ancestry in the Urals or Central Asia, depending on the historical school. This concept, not unlike that of most other nations, obviously excludes most religious minorities, due to their largely different ethnic background or/and language. Furthermore the predominance of Sunni Islam has lead to a de-facto identification of Sunni Islam as a defining characteristic of Turkish national identity. Thus religious minorities are not included in the most common perception of the Turkish nation.[3]  Besides one has to bear the role of history and the perception of history in mind when tracing the definition of nationhood. In the case of Turkey this includes many conflicts between the majority and religious minorities, in particular the Armenian community.

Consequently, even if the other factors would lend themselves to include these groups into the larger Turkish nation, the role of history presents itself as a barrier.[4]

 

1. Alevis

The Alevis are by far the largest religious minority in Turkey. They comprise at least 10 % of the Turkish population. Realistic guesses assume a proportion of the population ranging between a Quarter and a Fifth. The reason for the lack of accurate figures is two-fold. First of all, the official census of Turkey is not very reliable. Secondly, the Alevi have frequently been victims of persecution. Thus, there has been and still is a hesitancy to openly report the belief.

Alevism is an offspring of Shi’ism, but includes some other traditions as well. Alevis are not participating in the Ramadan or Hajj, neither do they adhere to the Sharia. It thus defies some of the basic pillars of mainstream Islam. Instead some moral norms are set independently from the Qur’an. There are different theories explaining the non-Muslim influences. One of them claims that Zoroastrianism has shaped this religion, as well as other pre-Islamic regional religions. Generally Alevism is viewed with suspicion from Sunni Islam and is not recognised as a legitimate off-spring of Islam.[5] 

The religious ceremonies (Cem) are conducted by a hereditary class of holy men (Dede), poems are recited (Nefes) and sometimes dances (Semah) are performed by men and women.

Generally women play a greater role within the religion and enjoy more rights than in mainstream Sunni Islam.[6]  Just like Sunni Islam, the Alevis also have their religious order, the Bektashi.

In Turkey one can distinguish four different Alevi communities. The two smaller ones are made up of Azeri Turks, whose interpretation of Alevism is very close to Shia Islam practised in Iran, and Arabic speaking Alevis. The Arabic Alevis live in the province of Hatay, bordering on the Mediterranean and Syria, around the city of Alexandretta. They share their interpretation of Alevism with the Alawites in Syria, where they are in leading positions.[7]

Both groups are small and unconnected to Turkish mainstream. The two biggest Alevi groups are the Turkish-speaking Alevis, who live mostly in central Anatolia, but also along the coast with Aegean and Mediterranean, in the European part of Turkey and increasingly in the big cities. The other major group are Kurdish Alevis, living predominantly in the Northwest of the Kurdish populated areas territories, with the centre of Dersim (province of Tunceli) in the centre and Northeast of the country.

During the Kurdish uprising in 1925 Alevi Kurds fought against the rebellion due to its Sunni overtones. In 1920 and 1937-38 there were rebellions by Kurdish Alevis. Generally the Alevi Kurds were supportive of the Kemalist Republic, since it seemed to protect their interests best.

Most Alevis lived in remote villages and only the more open climate towards them in the post World War 2 period encouraged their migration to bigger towns. This movement of Alevis caused tensions with the local Sunni population, which had never lived together with Alevis before. This and general problems of city immigration lead to predominantly Alevi communities in the big cities, in particular Istanbul.

The Alevis were closely associated with the political left in the 1970s. The Communists depicted their rebellions as proto-communist revolutions and saw them as their natural allies against the religious-nationalist right, who denied all rights to Alevis. At the same time many Alevis joined left-wing groups, especially the Turkish Workers Party. This lead to violence and pogroms against the Alevis by the national and religious right. Often the local police, infiltrated by the right, remained passive and even helped these persecutions. During one of the worst attacks in the late 1970s over 100 Alevis got killed by right-wing militants in Corum and Maras. While the Alevis mostly supported the state unconditionally prior to these persecutions, they differentiated between the state as such and institutions, which had been infiltrated by the political right.[8]

The military’s and Özal’s attempt after the intervention of the army in 1980 to include Sunni religion into mainstream politics increased Alevi dissatisfaction with the government. The Directorate on Religious Affairs decided now on the appointment of imams, the constructions of mosques and religious instruction in schools, also in Alevi communities. As a result the official interpretations does not take into account the specific issues and demands of the Alevi community. This does not lead to a suppression of Alevi belief. It rather meant that Alevi Islam receives no financial and institutional support from state, while Sunni Islam was and still is officially sanctioned by the state.[9]  A committee of leading Alevis described this problem in the following way to president Demirel: ”We are disturbed about...the human drama stemming from constantly postponing the settlement of Alevi-Bektashi problems; the unease we feel because our taxes are being used for the institutionalisation of religious and canonical structures.”[10]

The increasing role of Sunni Islam within the Turkish state has lead the Alevis to refocus on their religion. At the same time the left in Turkey lost many followers after its heyday in the Seventies and now frequently only Alevis were left as supporters and concentrated more on their interests, rather than those of the left as such. Other Alevis reacted against the long-standing influence of the left and therefore rediscovered religion as a traditional way of articulating their interests.

The liberalisation of Turkish society in the late eighties further encouraged publications and public advocacy of Alevis, Alevi religious traditions and the work of the Bektashi order, banned from public since 1925, could be performed again. Nevertheless publications in Turkey are still not allowed to carry an Alevi name and the religion is still not officially recognised.

The new authors of Alevi literature are laymen, breaking the tradition of the hereditary priests.

This development strengthened the identity of the Alevis and increased the sense of community. Heated debates among Alevi intellectuals were lead on whether Alevism is a part of Islam or to be considered separate.[11] 

The state increasingly supported Alevis, partly in order to split the Kurdish movement.

Mobilising Alevi Kurds was supposed to encourage internal divisions of the Kurds and support traditional allies of the Kemalist republic. As a result festivals and other events of the Alevis became frequently support by the state and were visited by leading politicians. The Haci Bektashi Veli festival 1995 in an Alevi village and centre of the Bektashi order for example was visited by president Demirel, the prime minister and the minister of culture.[12]

At the time the mid-nineties have been a time of renewed persecution of Alevis, not by the state, but by the increasingly influential religious right. In 1993 Intellectuals and artists, some of which were Alevis, gathered in the city of Sivas to celebrate the Alevi rebel saint and poet Pir Sultan Abdal, who was executed in the city. The province around the city has a substantial Turkish and Kurdish Alevi population. One leading Turkish intellectual, Aziz Nesin, who had announced his intention to publish a Turkish translation of The Satanic Verses, was also present, although not an Alevi himself. Islamists demonstrated against the meeting and were encouraged by the mayor, who was member of the Refah party. The crowd gathered around the hotel where the meeting took place and set it on fire with the intention of killing Nesin.

Although the central authorities supposedly tried command the police to stop this, they remained passive. As a result 37 people died, including many important Alevi intellectuals and journalists. One of the survivors was Nasin, the prime target of the attacks.[13] In March 1995 the relations between the police force and Alevis deteriorated further. On 12 March ”unknown” gunmen drove through the predominantly Kurdish Alevi Gazi neighbourhood in Istanbul and shoot at teahouses, killing one and wounding many more. There are several theories as of who committed this act. One assumes that radical Islamists took offence at the opening of tea houses during Ramadan, combined with their general disapproval of the Alevis, committed the shootings. A different explanation (favoured by the state) puts the blame on the PKK. Here the justification would be the lack of support among the Alevi Kurds for the Kurdish Workers Party.

After the police was failing to act swiftly, young Alevis began demonstrations. Clashes with the Police lead to riots. After the police shoot one demonstrator the protests began spread to other cities and within Istanbul itself. While young radical Alevis targeting the state in their increasingly violent protest, the older Alevis tried to calm the situation. The criticisms which arose during the demonstration widened substantially in their scope. The protestors voiced their dissatisfaction with their poor living standards and furthermore opposed the continuing exclusion of Alevis from Public Life. As the situations escalated, the police started shooting into the crowd, killing at least 15. The person responsible for the police action, Necdet Menzir, had to step down from his position in Istanbul in Summer 1995, only to become a member of parliament for the True Path Party soon afterwards.[14]

These events have reduced trust placed by the Alevi population in the police force. Also noticing that the prime responsible for these action were not punished has decreased their reliance on the state. Even if they still support the state and the Kemalist vision of Turkey, it has become obvious that some elements of the state show great hostility towards Alevis. The main threat for this religious minorities originated from the religious right, the Refah. At the same time also more moderate parties, such as the True Path party, carried some responsibility for the deteriorating relations between the Alevis and security forces. The threat of an all out rule of the Welfare party will probably insure continuing support of the Alevis, at least the Turkish Alevis for the state. Alevi Kurds on the other hand have the option of joining the PKK.

This has happened partly in the countryside. Since many Kurdish Alevis live in Gecekondus in Istanbul or the other big cities, their position towards the PKK is likely to remain distanced.

The state has tried to repair the relations with the Alevis, realising their importance as a religious group and at the same time recognising their role in support of the secular state.

President Demirel underlined this at a speech during the annual Haci Bektashi Veli festival:

”Clear your hearts of emotions like hostility and hate and replace them with tolerance and love instead. Turkey belongs to everyone living in this land.”[15]  Whether this approach of the state will suffice to insure Alevi support remains to be seen. For the moment the Alevis are still caught between the secular state, which recruits some of its most loyal supporters from the Alevis, but offers them very little protection and support and the Islamist perspective, which is mostly hostile towards this Muslim minority: ”The binary logic which view militant, radical Islam as an undifferentiated bloc in opposition to Republican secularism produces a political silence on the difference of Alevi belief within Islamic traditions, and their politics of difference in repudiating violence.”[16]  This logic actually tacitly assumes a dichotomy on most issues between Kemalists and Islamist. When it comes to the Alevis and other religious minorities as we shall see, there is a consensus between large segments of the secular elite and the Religious Right on their (mis-)treatment.

 

2. Non-Muslim Minorities

Less than 2 % of the Turkish population are not Muslims. Most of these minorities used to be a lot larger during Ottoman times and in the early years of the Turkish republic. Most non-Muslim minorities are closely identified with one state, i.e. Greek-Orthodox with Greece, the Jews with Israel (or the Jewish lobby in the United States). Thus, there is a tendency to project problems with the respective country onto the minority. Mostly minorities have suffered from this identification. Only the Jews have occasionally profited from being associated with Israel and the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States. All these political identifications tend to play a greater role than the religious differences. These minorities also tend to be more visible, than their size might suggest.

 

2.1. The Armenians

Although the Greek-Orthodox patriarchate receives more attention in the West, mostly due to its role in church affairs beyond Turkey, actually the Armenians form the largest remaining Christian community in Turkey. In 1976 approximately 42.000 Armenians (Gregorian church) lived in Istanbul. Many Armenians live or have a summer residence on one of the princess islands, Kinali, which is inhabited by 90% Armenians.

There are 35 Churches and Chapels and a Patriarchate in Istanbul. In addition there are 6 Catholic and 2 Protestant Armenian churches in Istanbul. They both comprise only a small group and hold less than 10.000 believers combined, but they maintain churches and schools in Turkey as well.[17]

There are two Armenian dailies, Jamanak (1.200 copies), written Armenian, with two pages using the Turkish alphabet for Armenian. Marmara (1.200-2.000) is the other daily. Their number of copies is so low, because many Armenians do not read and sometimes do not even speak Armenian anymore.[18]  Generally the Armenian community is in a precarious situations in regards to their identity. They are a relatively small group in a state which is perceived by Armenians elsewhere as their greatest enemy. An empirical study among the Armenian community of Istanbul in regard to their identity shows this division. While generally a majority of those asked view themselves predominantly as Armenian, a significant group defined themselves rather as Turks. Those were mostly the younger and better-educated members of the community: ”It appears that, having discovered the distinction between the in-group and the out-group, the younger generation of Turkish-Armenians have developed a weaker in group identity and a stronger out-group identity.”[19]  This conclusion points to a possible decrease and even disappearance of the Armenian community through assimilation. The Armenian community of Turkey is also in conflict with many other Armenian communities in the Diaspora or in Armenia over the relationship with Turkey. This deepens the identity crisis of the Armenian community in Turkey.

The pressure on the Armenian community to assimilate also points to a general observation in respects to homogenising tendencies in Turkey. The Kemalist Republic conflicts with the Armenians and other non-Muslim communities for two reasons. First of all there is the secularisation, which – as mentioned – threatens to deplete the religious minorities of the prime identifying characteristics. While the majority of Sunni as sufficient strength in numbers to retain their identity either through other criteria than religion or through informal religious networks, minorities cannot gather a similar cohesion. Secondly the nationalist nature of the Turkish republic constitutes a major problem for the non-Muslim minorities. This is because nations tend to endorse the majorities language, religion and perception, all of which contradict or at least differ from the those of most of these minorities. Furthermore most non-Muslim minorities tend to have a different ethnic or national background than the majority of Turks. So also from this perspective their position is highly volatile. This dual assimilatory pressure, religious through secularisation and ethnic through nationalism, has recently been reinforced by the revival of Islam. This revival as has been pointed out previously originate in a somewhat moderate level from the state and a more radical form from the Islamists. As stated in the introduction the two non-Muslim minorities, Armenians in particular, find their treatment put into the context of Turkish foreign policy.

Due to the tense relationship between Turks and Armenians, the Armenian Church is forced to show particular loyalty to the Turkish Republic (i.e. supporting and participating in the celebrations of Atatürk in 1981) Generally the situation of the Armenian church is better than that of the Orthodox. The times were difficult in the 70s when the ASALA, an Armenian terrorist group attacked Turkish embassies. No Armenians were accepted for civil service, the pressure on schools, church and people increased. In the nineties the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjian put Armenians again in an awkward position. After some heavy attacks on Nagorno-Karabach by Armenia even the instruction in Armenian was temporarily banned in schools. Attacks against Armenian churches and misrepresentation of Armenians remain commonplace in Turkey. Frequently attempts were undertaken by the government to connect the PKK with Armenians. This aims at inflating the role of Armenians and in order to construct a conspiracy theory against the Turkish state. Since Armenians are the largest non-Muslim group in Turkey, they are a prime target of religious and nationalist propaganda.[20]  Here again the rhetoric of the secular Nationalist and Islamist coincides. Interestingly enough the vocal support of Erbakan for the Turks in Cyprus and the Azeris against Armenian coincides rather with a Turkish nationalist agenda than a pure Islamist programme: ”The Islamists in power in Turkey are instinctively averse to both Greeks and Armenians. As deputy prime minister in 1974, Erbakan wanted Turkish troops to occupy all of Cyprus. In the electoral campaign that preceded the 1995 election, he made the bizarre claim that the Operation Provide Comfort...for the protection of Iraqi Kurds, was really meant to allow the creation of a Greater Armenia, as the British occupation of Palestine after World War I had provided a cover for the creation of Israel.” [21] Consequently, one has to perceived opposition between Secularists and Islamists, at least in regards to religious minority.

 

2.2. Jews

Only a few (1945: 76.965, 1985: 24.000) of the large number of Jews from Ottoman times are left in Turkey today, mainly due to migration to Israel. The overwhelming share of the live in Istanbul, furthermore there are some 1.500 Jews in Izmir (10 synagogues) and 130 in Antakya.

Some Jews still speak Ladino, a Spanish dialect common to sephardic Jews, the dominant branch of Judaism in Turkey. Today mostly Turkish is spoken. There is a Jewish Hospital and High School in Turkey today. The primary school is attended by 300 pupils, secondary school by 250. Turkish is language of instruction, with strong additional Hebrew. There is only one weekly newspaper for the Jewish community. It has eight pages in Turkish and one in Ladino.

There are 16 synagogues in Istanbul today, some date form the 15th century.[22]  Similar to the Armenian community, the Turkish state has ”internationalised” the Jewish community. In the case of the Jewish community it has always assure to send prominent members of the Turkish Jewish community to international bodies. Jews were especially helpful when it came to improve the reputation of Turkey abroad and to ease international actions taken against the country. [23]

The internal cohesion of the Jewish community is high. There is a functioning network for protecting the weak, helping for a job and education. As the Armenians the Jews use the Princess islands as a meeting ground and have summer houses. The main bond of the community is no longer the religious activities, but rather the social network. The secularisation has generally reduced the religiosity of the Jewish community.[24]  Since the Jewish community was more Westernised and economically more successful than the majority of the Turkish state, they could be seen as the frontrunner of the ideals the Kemalist state was striving for. At the same time the community remained separate from the majority, despite the secularisation of the state.[25]  Aron Rodrigue in his description of the development of the Jews in Turkey comes to the conclusions that ”even though the juridical millet disappeared, the Jews’ millet identity remained intact.”[26]

The community is very strong today and makes itself heard in Israel-Turkish relations and has repeatedly protected Turkey from accusations of the Armenia genocide. Due to good relations to Israel and Jews organisations around the world the situation of Jews in Turkey is probably the best in the Muslim world. This relationship is nevertheless problematic as well. It makes the Jewish community extremely vulnerable to possible conflicts between the countries.

Furthermore opponents of the state of Israel are quick to identify the Jews in Turkey very closely with the state. In 1986 a massacre occurred in the Neve Shalom synagogue. Although Arab terrorist were accused, this was never firmly established and Turks as perpetrators are likely.

Furthermore the protection of Turkey in the case of the Armenian genocide is morally very questionable. Tying their own survival to the unconditional support of the state puts the Jewish community in a vulnerable position, internally, as well as towards the outside.[27]  On the view of the Jews in Turkey the perspective of the Secular state and the Islamist is probably the most divergent. While Kemalists have sought to capitalise on the good treatment of Jews in Turkey relations with other countries, the United States and Israel in particular, the Islamist clearly take a hostile position towards Jews and Israel.[28]  The party president Necmettin Erbakan and leading members, as well as publications, do not limit their tirades to Israel, but take on a generally hostile tone towards all Jews. The Milli Gazete[29]  describes the Jews as a ”Nation condemn in the Qur’an.” The Verfassungsschutz of the German state Nordrhein-Westfalen, observing radical organisations, is noting a general increase in the anti-Semitism content of the publications close to Refah.[30]  The Welfare Party declared support for Human Rights seems cynical when recalling that a member of parliament and its human rights committee from Refah Partisi deplored the fact that Hitlers had failed in eliminating all the Jews.[31]  Thus Jews, while being the best protected minority by the secular state, are at the same time the prime target of radical Islamist. As long as the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbours and more Islamist groups of the Palestinian populations continues, the Jewish population will remain very vulnerable to Islamists in Turkey. Especially the close ties of the secular state with Israel and the role of Turkish Jews in this connection has infuriated Islamist and made them probably more hostile towards the Jewish population than in other countries.

 

3. The Islamisation of Turkey and the prospects for Religious Minorities

As has been documented with all three minorities, in particular with the Alevis, the governments of Turkey since the coup in 1980 have abandoned the ”pure” path of Kemalism and instead attempted to include Sunni Islam into the national concept. This is to be seen as an attempt to broaden the legitimacy of the state and its governments, or as Eric Rouleau, the former French ambassador to Turkey puts it: ”Under the current constitution, promulgated by the military government, the teaching of religion (i.e. Islam) is compulsory in all school ‘to cement national unity,’ in the words of General Kenan Evren, head of the military coup d’état of 1980. In practice, the principle of secularism, or separation of church and state, has been replaced by a system that places Islam under control of a secular government – a compromise between Kemalism and Ottomanism.”.[32] 

Turning briefly towards possible future developments in regards to the treatment of minorities, let us turn to the position of the Islamist Refah Partisi on the groups discussed here. The motto of the Welfare Party is ”Human rights and Liberties in Turkey.”[33]  In regards to religious minorities in Turkey this slogan borders on cynicism. The words and deeds of the Refah and its politicians in respect to all the minorities discussed here paint a bleak picture.[34]  Most prominent is the usage of anti-Semitism, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

While hostility towards Jews is very strongly developed, other religious minorities became targets of Islamist as well. The district mayor of the seat of the Greek-Orthodox patriarchate in Istanbul, a member of Refah, for example has threatened to make a ”triumphant entry into the Ecumenical Patriarchate through the sealed gate,” which was closed since a patriarch was hanged there in 1821.[35] 

In regards to the Alevi it just has to be recalled how the Refah mayor of Sivas encouraged the demonstration against the Alevi conference in 1993 which lead to the death of 37 Alevis. Since Alevis are considered heretics in Sunni Islam, their position is more vulnerable than the Judeo-Christian minorities, since they right to exist as such is not questioned by conventional interpretations of Islam, unlike the Alevis.

The outlook for minorities in case of a rule by the Welfare party is bleak. While their positions has been insecure and under constant pressure from the state, it is still much better than what can be expected from a rule by Refah.

There is little hope in the current political spectrum for improvement of the treatment of Minorities. Alevis have the best chances, since they are the largest and best integrated minority in Turkey. This nevertheless only applies in a continuation of secular politics. In a more Islamist state their position will be under threat, not only because of the religion, but also because of their vocal support for the secular Kemalist state. The religious minorities, with the exception of the Alevis, are very small in number and thus are under constant threat of assimilation. The fact that they receive relatively much attention from abroad is mainly due to their continuing harassment by the state. Only when the state embarks on a more tolerant view of minorities and a more inclusive concept of Turkish nationhood, these minorities will become less visible and better integrated into mainstream Turkish society. Prospects for this to happen are, as mentioned, not very good.

In conclusion one can only subscribe to the demand of Jürgen Habermas on the modernisation of the concept of nation state, in Turkey more than elsewhere:

    

Der Nationalstaat muß das ambivalente Potential, das einst als Schubkraft gewirkt abschütteln....Seinerzeit hat der Nationalstaat einen Zusammenhang politischer        

Kommunikation gestiftet, der es möglich machte, die Abstraktionsschübe der

gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung aufzufangen und eine aus überlieferten                 Lebenszusammenhängen herausgerissenen Bevölkerung über das Nationalbewußtsein

in die Kontexte einer erweiterten und rationalisierten Lebenswelt wieder einzubetten. Diese Integrationsfunktion konnte er um so eher erfüllen, als sich der Rechtsstatus des Bürgers mit der kulturellen Zugehörigkeit zur Nation verband. Heute, da sicher der Nationalstaat im Inneren durch die

Sprengkraft des Multikulturalismus...herausgefordert sieht, stellt sich die Frage, ob es für das Junktim von Staats- und Volksnation ein ebenso funktionales Äquivalent gibt.[36]

While the nation state everywhere, not only in Turkey, is increasingly under question, it has not lost its appeal to many and can still be a powerful tool of exclusion. Only when the nation state manages to incorporate the whole population of a country, which is in the case of Turkey not only the religious minorities, but also the disenchanted of the system, who form the support of the Islamists, it can be seen as truly successful.

 


 

4. Endnotes

1.      Additional space will devoted to the Alevi belief, since it is still largely unknown in the West.

2.      The Refah Party will serve as the chief example of Islamisation of Turkey. Nevertheless, this party is just the most visible exponent of a movement which is diverse and much broader than the party itself.

3.      For the importance of language and ancestry as defining elements of Turkish nationhood see Ziya Gökalp, ”The Ideal of Nationalism: Three Currents of Thought,” in Elie Kedourie (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London 1970) pp. 189-206.

4.      On the role of history in the development of Turkish nationalism see Tekin Alp, ”The Restauration of Turkish History,” in Elie Kedourie (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London 1970) pp. 207-224. On the general ambiguity of the Turkish national self-definition see Riva Kastoryano, ”L’Intégration politique par l’extérieur. La communauté juive de Turquie,” in Revue Française de Science Politique, Octobre 1992, p. 790.

5.      Jean-Francois Perouse, ”Une religion sans dogme contraignant,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, Juni 1996, p.16.

6.      Ursula Spuler-Stegeman, ”Der Islam,” in Klaus-Detlef Grothusen (ed.), Türkei, Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol. 4 (Göttingen 1985), pp. 605-606 and Mehrdad R. Izady, Alevism, quoted from: www.xs4all.nl/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/cult/alevi.html.

7.      President Assad as well as many members of the ruling Baath party elite and army are Alawis.

8.      Martin van Bruinessen, ”Kurds, Turks and the Alevi revival in Turkey,” in The Middle East Report, No. 200, Summer 1996, pp. 7-10.

9.      One has to bear in mind that even within the Sunni Muslim community no consensus can be found. This applies in particular to the role of the religious brotherhoods. For the role of the official Islam and the government support it receives see Ursula Spuler-Stegeman, ”Der Islam,” in Klaus-Detlef Grothusen (ed.), Türkei, Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol. 4 (Göttingen 1985), pp. 596-604.

10.     ”Alevi Summit at Cankaya,” TRKNWS-L, Turkish Press Review, 19.7.1995, quoted from: www.hri.org/news/agencies/trkpr/95-07-19.trkpr.htm, see also U.S. Department of State (ed.), Turkey Human Rights Practices, 1996, Freedom of Religion, 30.1.1997, quoted from: www.hri.org/ussd-ights/96/turkey96.htm.

11.     It is interesting to note that the Druse of Lebenon, another heterodox Muslim community, underwent similar internal debates before and during the civil war in Lebanon.

12.     ”Haci Bektas-i Veli Festival Starts,” TRKNWS-L, Turkish Press Review, 17.8.1995, quoted from: www.hri.org/news/agencies/trkpr/95-08-17.trkpr.htm

13.     Martin van Bruinessen, ”Kurds, Turks and the Alevi revival in Turkey,” in The Middle East Report, No. 200, Summer 1996, pp. 7-10. On the events in Sivas also see Das Progrom in Sivas, quoted from: www.aix.de/user/aagb/html/Sivas-d.htm

14.     Jean-Francois Perouse, ”Colère et humiliation des alévis,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, Juin 1996, p. 16, ”What’s the Difference between Algeria and Turkey?,” in The Economist, 18.3.1995, pp. 49-50 and Das Massaker von Gazi and Ümraniye, quoted from: www.aix.de/user/aagb/html/Gazi-d.htm

15.     ”Haci Bektas-i Veli Festival Starts,” TRKNWS-L, Turkish Press Review, 17.8.1995, quoted from: www.hri.org/news/agencies/trkpr/95-08-17.trkpr.htm.

16.     Banu Helvacioglu, ‘Allahu Ekber’, we are Turks: Yearning for a different Homecoming at the Periphery of Europe, in The Third World Quarterly, September 1996, p. 507.

17.     Betrold Spuler, ”Religiöse Minderheiten,” in Klaus-Detlef Grothusen (ed.), Türkei, Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol. 4 (Göttingen 1985), pp. 618-619.

18.     On the media and the cultural life of the Armenia community see Biligin Esme, Problems of the Armenians of Istanbul, quoted from: www.buism.ee.boun.edu.tr/%Eesme/arm/ARM.htm .

19.     Aghop Der-Karabetian, Natalie Balian, ”Ingroup, Outgroup, and Global-Human Identities of Turkish-Armenians,” in Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 132, No. 4, August 1992.

20.     Biligin Esme, Problems of the Armenians of Istanbul, quoted from: www.buism.ee.boun.edu.tr/%Eesme/arm/PRBLMS.htm and The Armenians in Turkey: An Oppressed Minority. A Partial Chronology of Events: 1993-1995, quoted from: www.armen-info.com/lacause/publcs/9510e3.htm .

21.     Andrew J. A. Mango, ”Testing Time in Turkey,” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.1, Winter 1997, pp. 13-14. In this context one has to point to an observation made by the Economist, which concludes that ”[T]he Welfare Party’s rhetoric in recent municipal by-elections had more than an echo of the demands for a just order that won mass support for the social-democratic politician Bulent Ecevit in the 1970s.” ”Turkey: Islam returns to Politics,” in The Economist, 27.2.1993, p.58.

22.     Bertold Spuler, ”Religiöse Minderheiten,” in Klaus-Detlef Grothusen (ed.), Türkei, Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol. 4 (Göttingen 1985), p. 620 and Education, language and social life of the Jews in Turkey, quoted from: www.mersina.com/lib/turkish_jews/history/education.htm

23.     Riva Kastoryano, L’Intégration politique par l’extérieur. La communauté juive de Turquie, in Revue Française de Science Politique, Octobre 1992, p. 792.

24.     idem, pp. 794-6.

25.     Aron Rodrigue, ”From Millet to Minority: Turkish Jewry,” in Pierre Birnbaum, Ira Katznelson (eds.), Paths of Emancipation, Jews, States and Citizenship (Princeton 1995) pp. 258-9.

26.     idem, p. 261.

27.     There are yet few analyses of the connection between the Jewish community, the Turkish state and the attempt to suppress negative coverage of Turkey in the US and elsewhere. The following report carries a heavy anti-Turkish bias (published by the Kurdish Information Network), but nevertheless reveals interesting act on this relationship: Vera Beaudin Saeedpour, Ties that Blind, quoted from: www.xs4all/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/a_month.html.

28.     It is nevertheless important to point out that the Erbabkan government continued Turkey’s relations with Israel, especially the much criticises military and intelligence co-operation.

29.     Milli Gazete is the newspaper of Milli Görüs, the Refah representation among the Turkish Gastarbeiter in Europe, particularly in Germany. The influence in financing and supporting the party is substantial.

30.     Verfassungsschutz Nordrhein-Westfalen (ed.), ”Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europe e.V. –Avrupa Milli Görüs Teskilateri (AGMT),” Verfassungsschutzbericht Nordrhein-Westfalen 1994, quoted from: www.verfassungsschutz.nrw.de/jahr94/4_1_2.htm.

31.     ”Turkey: Islam returns to Politics,” in The Economist, 27.2.1993, p.58.

32.     Erich Rouleau, ”The Challenges to Turkey: The Contradictions of Atatürk’s Legacy,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.5, November/December 1993, pp. 120-121.

33.     for the programme of the Refah see www.rp.org.tr/ingilizce/ and www.access.ch/tuerkei/grupb/b3/b3e.htm

34.     Generally it is in order to separate words and deeds of Refah. Andrew Mango in his analysis of Refah rule comes to the conclusion that the actions are actually much more modest than the rhetoric might suggest. He argues that the Welfare Party is more concerned with obtaining power and being able to protect and foster its supporters than implementing its stated policy goals. The reasons for this modesty are obvious.

The external pressure from the West and the internal weight thrown behind the secular state by the army limited the options for Erbakan. This is different for the treatment of minorities. Since the army and the political establishment is not likely to protect the minorities against pressure from Refah, the threats against minorities might actually be one of the few fields for relatively great consensus between secular and Islamist parties. see Andrew J. A. Mango, ”Testing Time in Turkey,” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.1, Winter 1997, pp. 3-20.

35.     Continued Oppression of Hellenism in Turkey, quoted from: w4.eexi.gr/~ippotis/istoria3en.html.

36.     In his latest collection of studies Habermas makes a strong appeal to include the ”other” into societies, instead of basing the self-definition of communities on exclusion. His chapter ”Der europäische Nationalsstaat – Zu Vergangenheit und Zukunft von Souveränität und Staatbürgerschaft” (pp. 128-153) applies this approach to the concept of nation state. Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehungen des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie (Frankfurt/Main 1996) p. 141.


 

5. Literature

Some of the sources used for this paper originate from the Internet. While some merely the reproductions of respectable printed work, others have to be seen more critically. There is an abundance of propaganda and one-side material on the topic dealt with available. Some contain interesting information and deliver a specific perspective, which is valuable, if analysed with a critical perspective. If they were used, the information contained was examined cautiously and only presented, when it seemed to be in line within the generally scholarly framework.

Tekin Alp, ”The Restauration of Turkish History,” in Elie Kedourie (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London 1970) pp. 207-224.

Martin van Bruinessen, ”Kurds, Turks and the Alevi revival in Turkey,” in The Middle East Report, No. 200, Summer 1996, pp. 7-10.

Aghop Der-Karabetian, Natalie Balian, ”Ingroup, Outgroup, and Global-Human Identities of Turkish-Armenians,” in Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 132, No. 4, August 1992, pp. 497-504.

Biligin Esme, Problems of the Armenians of Istanbul, quoted from: www.buism.ee.boun.edu.tr/%Eesme/arm/ARM.htm.

Ziya Gökalp, ”The Ideal of Nationalism: Three Currents of Thought,” in Elie Kedourie (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa (London 1970) pp. 189-206.

Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehungen des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie (Frankfurt/Main 1996).

Banu Helvacioglu, ‘Allahu Ekber’, we are Turks: Yearning for a different Homecoming at the Periphery of Europe, in The Third World Quarterly, September 1996, pp. 503-523.

Mehrdad R. Izady, Alevism, quoted from: www.xs4all.nl/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/cult/alevi.html.

Riva Kastoryano, ”L’Intégration politique par l’extérieur. La communauté juive de Turquie,” in Revue Française de Science Politique, Octobre 1992, pp. 786-801

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland (ed.), Prosperity party, quoted from: www.access.ch/tuerkei/grupb/b3/b3e.htm.

Andrew J. A. Mango, ”Testing Time in Turkey,” in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.1, Winter 1997, pp. 3-20.

Jean-Francois Perouse, ”Une religion sans dogme contraignant,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, Juni 1996, p.16.

Jean-Francois Perouse, ”Colère et humiliation des alévis,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, Juin 1996, p. 16

Refah Party, www.rp.org.tr/ingilizce/.

Aron Rodrigue, ”From Millet to Minority: Turkish Jewry,” in Pierre Birnbaum, Ira Katznelson (eds.), Paths of Emancipation, Jews, States and Citizenship (Princeton 1995) pp. 256-261.

Erich Rouleau, ”The Challenges to Turkey: The Contradictions of Atatürk’s Legacy,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.5, November/December 1993, pp. 110-126.

Vera Beaudin Saeedpour, Ties that Blind, quoted from: www.xs4all/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/a_month.html.

Betrold Spuler, ”Religiöse Minderheiten,” in Klaus-Detlef Grothusen (ed.), Türkei, Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol. 4 (Göttingen 1985), pp. 613-620.

Ursula Spuler-Stegeman, ”Der Islam,” in Klaus-Detlef Grothusen (ed.), Türkei, Südosteuropa-Handbuch, Vol. 4 (Göttingen 1985), pp. 590-612.

U.S. Department of State (ed.), Freedom of Religion, Turkey Human Rights Practices, 1996, 30.1.1997, quoted from: www.hri.org/ussd-rights/96/turkey96.htm .

Verfassungsschutz Nordrhein-Westfalen (ed.), ”Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europe e.V. – Avrupa Milli Görüs Teskilateri (AGMT),” in Verfassungsschutzbericht Nordrhein-Westfalen 1994, quoted from: www.verfassungsschutz.nrw.de/jahr94/4_1_2.htm.

”Alevi Summit at Cankaya,” TRKNWS-L, Turkish Press Review, 19.7.1995, quoted from: www.hri.org/news/agencies/trkpr/95-07-19.trkpr.htmwww.hri.org/news/agencies/trkpr/95-07-19.trkpr.htm.

Continued Oppression of Hellenism in Turkey, quoted from: w4.eexi.gr/~ippotis/istoria3en.html.

Das Massaker von Gazi and Ümraniye, quoted from: www.aix.de/user/aagb/html/Gazi-d.htm.

Das Progrom in Sivas, quoted from: www.aix.de/user/aagb/html/Sivas-d.htm.

”Haci Bektas-i Veli Festival Starts,” TRKNWS-L, Turkish Press Review, 17.8.1995, quoted from: www.hri.org/news/agencies/trkpr/95-08-17.trkpr.htm.

The Armenians in Turkey: An Oppressed Minority. A Partial Chronology of Events: 1993-1995, quoted from: www.armen-info.com/lacause/publcs/9510e3.htm

”Turkey: Islam returns to Politics,” in The Economist, 27.2.1993, p.58

”What’s the Difference between Algeria and Turkey?,” in The Economist, 18.3.1995, pp. 49-50