Florian
Bieber
Alevis,
Armenians and Jews in Turkey
3.
The Islamisation of Turkey and the prospects for Religious
Minorities
The modern republic of Turkey was founded on the ruins of one of the great multinational powers, the Ottoman Empire. The lands under the rule of the Ottoman dynasty not only reached from Arabia to Hungary, but also included a multitude of ethnic and religious minorities on its territory. While Turkey inherited a large share of this diversity, it has decreased considerably since the war of liberation, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s. Of the millets, the self-administrative communities of Jews, Armenians and Orthodox within the Empire, only small groups remain. Most of them live in Istanbul. Besides these Jewish and Christian minorities, Turkey is also the home to a much larger Muslim minority – the Alevis.
While
it is worthwhile examining the status and the development of minorities in
their own right, it is important to view them as an indicator of
nation-building in Turkey. The treatment of such minorities allows the
observer to draw conclusions on the concept of nationhood and the general
attitude towards the ”other,” encompassing minorities in general.
This
paper will focus only on religious minorities, while bearing in mind the
multitude of ethnic divisions within Turkey, the Kurds just being the largest
and most prominent group. This paper will also not analyse the legal framework
of the minority’s position, but rather their real living conditions in
Turkey today. Furthermore there is no space to make a mention of all religious
minorities. Here the topic shall be limited just to the three most prominent
and largest religious minorities: the Alevis, the Armenian community and the
Jews [1]. Their development and treatment is representative and applies
mostly to the other religious minorities as well.
The
latter two communities can serve as an example of the relationship between
Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and the treatment of its minorities.
The analysis of the Alevis shall demonstrate the situation of a large, but
marginalised, minority in Turkey. All of them are paradoxically threatened by
the secular state and the rise of Political Islam at the same time.[2]
This
seeming contradiction will be examined throughout the paper.
At first it might seem surprising that the situation of religious minorities
is more precarious in a secular republic than in the previous Islamic Ottoman
state. This development is nevertheless obvious when bearing in mind two
factors. First of all the aggressively secular nature of the state did not
only effect the dominant Sunni establishment, but also all other religious
groups.
The
Ottoman state generally recognised the other main religions based on the
scripture, that is Christianity and Judaism, despite not treating them as
equals. The Turkish state deprived these groups of their prime identifying
characteristic - religion. Since religious minorities are in a weaker position
than the majority, the closure of schools and churches/synagogues had greater
effects on their identity than the same actions taken against Sunni Islam.
Consequently religious minorities had to suffer harsher consequences from the
secularisation than Sunni Islam.
Secondly,
one has to consider the conception of Turkish nationhood. While leading
politicians continuously proclaim that the Turkish nation extends to all its
citizens, the reality and underlying ideology of Turkish nationalism takes
different perspective. The Turkish nation defines itself as a nation of Turks,
speaking Turkish as language and having common ancestry in the Urals or
Central Asia, depending on the historical school. This concept, not unlike
that of most other nations, obviously excludes most religious minorities, due
to their largely different ethnic background or/and language. Furthermore the
predominance of Sunni Islam has lead to a de-facto identification of Sunni
Islam as a defining characteristic of Turkish national identity. Thus
religious minorities are not included in the most common perception of the
Turkish nation.[3] Besides one has to bear the role of history and the
perception of history in mind when tracing the definition of nationhood. In
the case of Turkey this includes many conflicts between the majority and
religious minorities, in particular the Armenian community.
Consequently,
even if the other factors would lend themselves to include these groups into
the larger Turkish nation, the role of history presents itself as a barrier.[4]
The
Alevis are by far the largest religious minority in Turkey. They comprise at
least 10 % of the Turkish population. Realistic guesses assume a proportion of
the population ranging between a Quarter and a Fifth. The reason for the lack
of accurate figures is two-fold. First of all, the official census of Turkey
is not very reliable. Secondly, the Alevi have frequently been victims of
persecution. Thus, there has been and still is a hesitancy to openly report
the belief.
Alevism
is an offspring of Shi’ism, but includes some other traditions as well.
Alevis are not participating in the Ramadan or Hajj, neither do they adhere to
the Sharia. It thus defies some of the basic pillars of mainstream Islam.
Instead some moral norms are set independently from the Qur’an. There are
different theories explaining the non-Muslim influences. One of them claims
that Zoroastrianism has shaped this religion, as well as other pre-Islamic
regional religions. Generally Alevism is viewed with suspicion from Sunni
Islam and is not recognised as a legitimate off-spring of Islam.[5]
The
religious ceremonies (Cem) are conducted by a hereditary class of holy men (Dede),
poems are recited (Nefes) and sometimes dances (Semah) are performed by men
and women.
Generally
women play a greater role within the religion and enjoy more rights than in
mainstream Sunni Islam.[6] Just like Sunni Islam, the Alevis also have their religious
order, the Bektashi.
In
Turkey one can distinguish four different Alevi communities. The two smaller
ones are made up of Azeri Turks, whose interpretation of Alevism is very close
to Shia Islam practised in Iran, and Arabic speaking Alevis. The Arabic Alevis
live in the province of Hatay, bordering on the Mediterranean and Syria,
around the city of Alexandretta. They share their interpretation of Alevism
with the Alawites in Syria, where they are in leading positions.[7]
Both
groups are small and unconnected to Turkish mainstream. The two biggest Alevi
groups are the Turkish-speaking Alevis, who live mostly in central Anatolia,
but also along the coast with Aegean and Mediterranean, in the European part
of Turkey and increasingly in the big cities. The other major group are
Kurdish Alevis, living predominantly in the Northwest of the Kurdish populated
areas territories, with the centre of Dersim (province of Tunceli) in the
centre and Northeast of the country.
During
the Kurdish uprising in 1925 Alevi Kurds fought against the rebellion due to
its Sunni overtones. In 1920 and 1937-38 there were rebellions by Kurdish
Alevis. Generally the Alevi Kurds were supportive of the Kemalist Republic,
since it seemed to protect their interests best.
Most
Alevis lived in remote villages and only the more open climate towards them in
the post World War 2 period encouraged their migration to bigger towns. This
movement of Alevis caused tensions with the local Sunni population, which had
never lived together with Alevis before. This and general problems of city
immigration lead to predominantly Alevi communities in the big cities, in
particular Istanbul.
The
Alevis were closely associated with the political left in the 1970s. The
Communists depicted their rebellions as proto-communist revolutions and saw
them as their natural allies against the religious-nationalist right, who
denied all rights to Alevis. At the same time many Alevis joined left-wing
groups, especially the Turkish Workers Party. This lead to violence and
pogroms against the Alevis by the national and religious right. Often the
local police, infiltrated by the right, remained passive and even helped these
persecutions. During one of the worst attacks in the late 1970s over 100
Alevis got killed by right-wing militants in Corum and Maras. While the Alevis
mostly supported the state unconditionally prior to these persecutions, they
differentiated between the state as such and institutions, which had been
infiltrated by the political right.[8]
The
military’s and Özal’s attempt after the intervention of the army in 1980
to include Sunni religion into mainstream politics increased Alevi
dissatisfaction with the government. The Directorate on Religious Affairs
decided now on the appointment of imams, the constructions of mosques and
religious instruction in schools, also in Alevi communities. As a result the
official interpretations does not take into account the specific issues and
demands of the Alevi community. This does not lead to a suppression of Alevi
belief. It rather meant that Alevi Islam receives no financial and
institutional support from state, while Sunni Islam was and still is
officially sanctioned by the state.[9]
A committee of leading Alevis described this problem in the following
way to president Demirel: ”We are disturbed about...the human drama stemming
from constantly postponing the settlement of Alevi-Bektashi problems; the
unease we feel because our taxes are being used for the institutionalisation
of religious and canonical structures.”[10]
The
increasing role of Sunni Islam within the Turkish state has lead the Alevis to
refocus on their religion. At the same time the left in Turkey lost many
followers after its heyday in the Seventies and now frequently only Alevis
were left as supporters and concentrated more on their interests, rather than
those of the left as such. Other Alevis reacted against the long-standing
influence of the left and therefore rediscovered religion as a traditional way
of articulating their interests.
The
liberalisation of Turkish society in the late eighties further encouraged
publications and public advocacy of Alevis, Alevi religious traditions and the
work of the Bektashi order, banned from public since 1925, could be performed
again. Nevertheless publications in Turkey are still not allowed to carry an
Alevi name and the religion is still not officially recognised.
The
new authors of Alevi literature are laymen, breaking the tradition of the
hereditary priests.
This
development strengthened the identity of the Alevis and increased the sense of
community. Heated debates among Alevi intellectuals were lead on whether
Alevism is a part of Islam or to be considered separate.[11]
The
state increasingly supported Alevis, partly in order to split the Kurdish
movement.
Mobilising
Alevi Kurds was supposed to encourage internal divisions of the Kurds and
support traditional allies of the Kemalist republic. As a result festivals and
other events of the Alevis became frequently support by the state and were
visited by leading politicians. The Haci Bektashi Veli festival 1995 in an
Alevi village and centre of the Bektashi order for example was visited by
president Demirel, the prime minister and the minister of culture.[12]
At the
time the mid-nineties have been a time of renewed persecution of Alevis, not
by the state, but by the increasingly influential religious right. In 1993
Intellectuals and artists, some of which were Alevis, gathered in the city of
Sivas to celebrate the Alevi rebel saint and poet Pir Sultan Abdal, who was
executed in the city. The province around the city has a substantial Turkish
and Kurdish Alevi population. One leading Turkish intellectual, Aziz Nesin,
who had announced his intention to publish a Turkish translation of The
Satanic Verses, was also present, although not an Alevi himself. Islamists
demonstrated against the meeting and were encouraged by the mayor, who was
member of the Refah party. The crowd gathered around the hotel where the
meeting took place and set it on fire with the intention of killing Nesin.
Although
the central authorities supposedly tried command the police to stop this, they
remained passive. As a result 37 people died, including many important Alevi
intellectuals and journalists. One of the survivors was Nasin, the prime
target of the attacks.[13] In
March 1995 the relations between the police force and Alevis deteriorated
further. On 12 March ”unknown” gunmen drove through the predominantly
Kurdish Alevi Gazi neighbourhood in Istanbul and shoot at teahouses, killing
one and wounding many more. There are several theories as of who committed
this act. One assumes that radical Islamists took offence at the opening of
tea houses during Ramadan, combined with their general disapproval of the
Alevis, committed the shootings. A different explanation (favoured by the
state) puts the blame on the PKK. Here the justification would be the lack of
support among the Alevi Kurds for the Kurdish Workers Party.
After
the police was failing to act swiftly, young Alevis began demonstrations.
Clashes with the Police lead to riots. After the police shoot one demonstrator
the protests began spread to other cities and within Istanbul itself. While
young radical Alevis targeting the state in their increasingly violent protest,
the older Alevis tried to calm the situation. The criticisms which arose
during the demonstration widened substantially in their scope. The protestors
voiced their dissatisfaction with their poor living standards and furthermore
opposed the continuing exclusion of Alevis from Public Life. As the situations
escalated, the police started shooting into the crowd, killing at least 15.
The person responsible for the police action, Necdet Menzir, had to step down
from his position in Istanbul in Summer 1995, only to become a member of
parliament for the True Path Party soon afterwards.[14]
These
events have reduced trust placed by the Alevi population in the police force.
Also noticing that the prime responsible for these action were not punished
has decreased their reliance on the state. Even if they still support the
state and the Kemalist vision of Turkey, it has become obvious that some
elements of the state show great hostility towards Alevis. The main threat for
this religious minorities originated from the religious right, the Refah. At
the same time also more moderate parties, such as the True Path party, carried
some responsibility for the deteriorating relations between the Alevis and
security forces. The threat of an all out rule of the Welfare party will
probably insure continuing support of the Alevis, at least the Turkish Alevis
for the state. Alevi Kurds on the other hand have the option of joining the
PKK.
This
has happened partly in the countryside. Since many Kurdish Alevis live in
Gecekondus in Istanbul or the other big cities, their position towards the PKK
is likely to remain distanced.
The
state has tried to repair the relations with the Alevis, realising their
importance as a religious group and at the same time recognising their role in
support of the secular state.
President
Demirel underlined this at a speech during the annual Haci Bektashi Veli
festival:
”Clear
your hearts of emotions like hostility and hate and replace them with
tolerance and love instead. Turkey belongs to everyone living in this land.”[15] Whether this approach of the state will suffice to insure
Alevi support remains to be seen. For the moment the Alevis are still caught
between the secular state, which recruits some of its most loyal supporters
from the Alevis, but offers them very little protection and support and the
Islamist perspective, which is mostly hostile towards this Muslim minority:
”The binary logic which view militant, radical Islam as an undifferentiated
bloc in opposition to Republican secularism produces a political silence on
the difference of Alevi belief within Islamic traditions, and their politics
of difference in repudiating violence.”[16]
This logic actually tacitly assumes a dichotomy on most issues between
Kemalists and Islamist. When it comes to the Alevis and other religious
minorities as we shall see, there is a consensus between large segments of the
secular elite and the Religious Right on their (mis-)treatment.
Less
than 2 % of the Turkish population are not Muslims. Most of these minorities
used to be a lot larger during Ottoman times and in the early years of the
Turkish republic. Most non-Muslim minorities are closely identified with one
state, i.e. Greek-Orthodox with Greece, the Jews with Israel (or the Jewish
lobby in the United States). Thus, there is a tendency to project problems
with the respective country onto the minority. Mostly minorities have suffered
from this identification. Only the Jews have occasionally profited from being
associated with Israel and the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States. All
these political identifications tend to play a greater role than the religious
differences. These minorities also tend to be more visible, than their size
might suggest.
Although
the Greek-Orthodox patriarchate receives more attention in the West, mostly
due to its role in church affairs beyond Turkey, actually the Armenians form
the largest remaining Christian community in Turkey. In 1976 approximately
42.000 Armenians (Gregorian church) lived in Istanbul. Many Armenians live or
have a summer residence on one of the princess islands, Kinali, which is
inhabited by 90% Armenians.
There
are 35 Churches and Chapels and a Patriarchate in Istanbul. In addition there
are 6 Catholic and 2 Protestant Armenian churches in Istanbul. They both
comprise only a small group and hold less than 10.000 believers combined, but
they maintain churches and schools in Turkey as well.[17]
There
are two Armenian dailies, Jamanak (1.200 copies), written Armenian, with two
pages using the Turkish alphabet for Armenian. Marmara (1.200-2.000) is the
other daily. Their number of copies is so low, because many Armenians do not
read and sometimes do not even speak Armenian anymore.[18]
Generally the Armenian community is in a precarious situations in
regards to their identity. They are a relatively small group in a state which
is perceived by Armenians elsewhere as their greatest enemy. An empirical
study among the Armenian community of Istanbul in regard to their identity
shows this division. While generally a majority of those asked view themselves
predominantly as Armenian, a significant group defined themselves rather as
Turks. Those were mostly the younger and better-educated members of the
community: ”It appears that, having discovered the distinction between the
in-group and the out-group, the younger generation of Turkish-Armenians have
developed a weaker in group identity and a stronger out-group identity.”[19]
This conclusion points to a possible decrease and even disappearance of
the Armenian community through assimilation. The Armenian community of Turkey
is also in conflict with many other Armenian communities in the Diaspora or in
Armenia over the relationship with Turkey. This deepens the identity crisis of
the Armenian community in Turkey.
The
pressure on the Armenian community to assimilate also points to a general
observation in respects to homogenising tendencies in Turkey. The Kemalist
Republic conflicts with the Armenians and other non-Muslim communities for two
reasons. First of all there is the secularisation, which – as mentioned –
threatens to deplete the religious minorities of the prime identifying
characteristics. While the majority of Sunni as sufficient strength in numbers
to retain their identity either through other criteria than religion or
through informal religious networks, minorities cannot gather a similar
cohesion. Secondly the nationalist nature of the Turkish republic constitutes
a major problem for the non-Muslim minorities. This is because nations tend to
endorse the majorities language, religion and perception, all of which
contradict or at least differ from the those of most of these minorities.
Furthermore most non-Muslim minorities tend to have a different ethnic or
national background than the majority of Turks. So also from this perspective
their position is highly volatile. This dual assimilatory pressure, religious
through secularisation and ethnic through nationalism, has recently been
reinforced by the revival of Islam. This revival as has been pointed out
previously originate in a somewhat moderate level from the state and a more
radical form from the Islamists. As stated in the introduction the two
non-Muslim minorities, Armenians in particular, find their treatment put into
the context of Turkish foreign policy.
Due to
the tense relationship between Turks and Armenians, the Armenian Church is
forced to show particular loyalty to the Turkish Republic (i.e. supporting and
participating in the celebrations of Atatürk in 1981) Generally the situation
of the Armenian church is better than that of the Orthodox. The times were
difficult in the 70s when the ASALA, an Armenian terrorist group attacked
Turkish embassies. No Armenians were accepted for civil service, the pressure
on schools, church and people increased. In the nineties the conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaidjian put Armenians again in an awkward position. After
some heavy attacks on Nagorno-Karabach by Armenia even the instruction in
Armenian was temporarily banned in schools. Attacks against Armenian churches
and misrepresentation of Armenians remain commonplace in Turkey. Frequently
attempts were undertaken by the government to connect the PKK with Armenians.
This aims at inflating the role of Armenians and in order to construct a
conspiracy theory against the Turkish state. Since Armenians are the largest
non-Muslim group in Turkey, they are a prime target of religious and
nationalist propaganda.[20]
Here again the rhetoric of the secular Nationalist and Islamist
coincides. Interestingly enough the vocal support of Erbakan for the Turks in
Cyprus and the Azeris against Armenian coincides rather with a Turkish
nationalist agenda than a pure Islamist programme: ”The Islamists in power
in Turkey are instinctively averse to both Greeks and Armenians. As deputy
prime minister in 1974, Erbakan wanted Turkish troops to occupy all of Cyprus.
In the electoral campaign that preceded the 1995 election, he made the bizarre
claim that the Operation Provide Comfort...for the protection of Iraqi Kurds,
was really meant to allow the creation of a Greater Armenia, as the British
occupation of Palestine after World War I had provided a cover for the
creation of Israel.” [21]
Consequently, one has to perceived opposition between Secularists and
Islamists, at least in regards to religious minority.
Only a
few (1945: 76.965, 1985: 24.000) of the large number of Jews from Ottoman
times are left in Turkey today, mainly due to migration to Israel. The
overwhelming share of the live in Istanbul, furthermore there are some 1.500
Jews in Izmir (10 synagogues) and 130 in Antakya.
Some
Jews still speak Ladino, a Spanish dialect common to sephardic Jews, the
dominant branch of Judaism in Turkey. Today mostly Turkish is spoken. There is
a Jewish Hospital and High School in Turkey today. The primary school is
attended by 300 pupils, secondary school by 250. Turkish is language of
instruction, with strong additional Hebrew. There is only one weekly newspaper
for the Jewish community. It has eight pages in Turkish and one in Ladino.
There
are 16 synagogues in Istanbul today, some date form the 15th century.[22] Similar to the Armenian community, the Turkish state has ”internationalised”
the Jewish community. In the case of the Jewish community it has always assure
to send prominent members of the Turkish Jewish community to international
bodies. Jews were especially helpful when it came to improve the reputation of
Turkey abroad and to ease international actions taken against the country. [23]
The
internal cohesion of the Jewish community is high. There is a functioning
network for protecting the weak, helping for a job and education. As the
Armenians the Jews use the Princess islands as a meeting ground and have
summer houses. The main bond of the community is no longer the religious
activities, but rather the social network. The secularisation has generally
reduced the religiosity of the Jewish community.[24]
Since the Jewish community was more Westernised and economically more
successful than the majority of the Turkish state, they could be seen as the
frontrunner of the ideals the Kemalist state was striving for. At the same
time the community remained separate from the majority, despite the
secularisation of the state.[25]
Aron Rodrigue in his description of the development of the Jews in
Turkey comes to the conclusions that ”even though the juridical millet
disappeared, the Jews’ millet identity remained intact.”[26]
The
community is very strong today and makes itself heard in Israel-Turkish
relations and has repeatedly protected Turkey from accusations of the Armenia
genocide. Due to good relations to Israel and Jews organisations around the
world the situation of Jews in Turkey is probably the best in the Muslim world.
This relationship is nevertheless problematic as well. It makes the Jewish
community extremely vulnerable to possible conflicts between the countries.
Furthermore
opponents of the state of Israel are quick to identify the Jews in Turkey very
closely with the state. In 1986 a massacre occurred in the Neve Shalom
synagogue. Although Arab terrorist were accused, this was never firmly
established and Turks as perpetrators are likely.
Furthermore
the protection of Turkey in the case of the Armenian genocide is morally very
questionable. Tying their own survival to the unconditional support of the
state puts the Jewish community in a vulnerable position, internally, as well
as towards the outside.[27] On the view of the Jews in Turkey the perspective of the
Secular state and the Islamist is probably the most divergent. While Kemalists
have sought to capitalise on the good treatment of Jews in Turkey relations
with other countries, the United States and Israel in particular, the Islamist
clearly take a hostile position towards Jews and Israel.[28]
The party president Necmettin Erbakan and leading members, as well as
publications, do not limit their tirades to Israel, but take on a generally
hostile tone towards all Jews. The Milli Gazete[29]
describes the Jews as a ”Nation condemn in the Qur’an.” The
Verfassungsschutz of the German state Nordrhein-Westfalen, observing radical
organisations, is noting a general increase in the anti-Semitism content of
the publications close to Refah.[30]
The Welfare Party declared support for Human Rights seems cynical when
recalling that a member of parliament and its human rights committee from
Refah Partisi deplored the fact that Hitlers had failed in eliminating all the
Jews.[31] Thus Jews, while being the best protected minority by the
secular state, are at the same time the prime target of radical Islamist. As
long as the conflict between Israel and some of its neighbours and more
Islamist groups of the Palestinian populations continues, the Jewish
population will remain very vulnerable to Islamists in Turkey. Especially the
close ties of the secular state with Israel and the role of Turkish Jews in
this connection has infuriated Islamist and made them probably more hostile
towards the Jewish population than in other countries.
3.
The Islamisation of Turkey and the prospects for Religious Minorities
As has
been documented with all three minorities, in particular with the Alevis, the
governments of Turkey since the coup in 1980 have abandoned the ”pure”
path of Kemalism and instead attempted to include Sunni Islam into the
national concept. This is to be seen as an attempt to broaden the legitimacy
of the state and its governments, or as Eric Rouleau, the former French
ambassador to Turkey puts it: ”Under the current constitution, promulgated
by the military government, the teaching of religion (i.e. Islam) is
compulsory in all school ‘to cement national unity,’ in the words of
General Kenan Evren, head of the military coup d’état of 1980. In practice,
the principle of secularism, or separation of church and state, has been
replaced by a system that places Islam under control of a secular government
– a compromise between Kemalism and Ottomanism.”.[32]
Turning
briefly towards possible future developments in regards to the treatment of
minorities, let us turn to the position of the Islamist Refah Partisi on the
groups discussed here. The motto of the Welfare Party is ”Human rights and
Liberties in Turkey.”[33]
In regards to religious minorities in Turkey this slogan borders on
cynicism. The words and deeds of the Refah and its politicians in respect to
all the minorities discussed here paint a bleak picture.[34] Most prominent is the usage of anti-Semitism, as mentioned in
the previous chapter.
While
hostility towards Jews is very strongly developed, other religious minorities
became targets of Islamist as well. The district mayor of the seat of the
Greek-Orthodox patriarchate in Istanbul, a member of Refah, for example has
threatened to make a ”triumphant entry into the Ecumenical Patriarchate
through the sealed gate,” which was closed since a patriarch was hanged
there in 1821.[35]
In
regards to the Alevi it just has to be recalled how the Refah mayor of Sivas
encouraged the demonstration against the Alevi conference in 1993 which lead
to the death of 37 Alevis. Since Alevis are considered heretics in Sunni
Islam, their position is more vulnerable than the Judeo-Christian minorities,
since they right to exist as such is not questioned by conventional
interpretations of Islam, unlike the Alevis.
The
outlook for minorities in case of a rule by the Welfare party is bleak. While
their positions has been insecure and under constant pressure from the state,
it is still much better than what can be expected from a rule by Refah.
There
is little hope in the current political spectrum for improvement of the
treatment of Minorities. Alevis have the best chances, since they are the
largest and best integrated minority in Turkey. This nevertheless only applies
in a continuation of secular politics. In a more Islamist state their position
will be under threat, not only because of the religion, but also because of
their vocal support for the secular Kemalist state. The religious minorities,
with the exception of the Alevis, are very small in number and thus are under
constant threat of assimilation. The fact that they receive relatively much
attention from abroad is mainly due to their continuing harassment by the
state. Only when the state embarks on a more tolerant view of minorities and a
more inclusive concept of Turkish nationhood, these minorities will become
less visible and better integrated into mainstream Turkish society. Prospects
for this to happen are, as mentioned, not very good.
In
conclusion one can only subscribe to the demand of Jürgen Habermas on the
modernisation of the concept of nation state, in Turkey more than elsewhere: